May 15, Puerta del Sol

On May 15, close to the local and regional elections in Spain, thousands of young people gathered on Madrid’s main square – Puerta del Sol. They gathered to protest against unemployment, inapt handling of the crisis by the socialists, terrible economic situation of the country, and against the stagnation of the political scene, mainly the domination of two political parties, leaving only two possibilities: the socialists or the conservatives. The protests have begun to spread throughout whole country – the biggest took place in Barcelona, Malaga and other major Spanish cities. Next was the launch of the  website for Democracia Real Ya! (Real Democracy NOW!) and the publication of  The Indignants Manifesto. Their motto is: ‘Europe for citizens not for markets. We are not merchandise in the hands of politicians and bankers.’ In their manifesto the Idignants claim that the current political status system does not take care of basic civil rights; they demand democratic rules to be respected and object to social inequality. In more pragmatic terms, they demand the elimination of privileges of the political class, taking steps to combat  unemployment, improvement of public services, including health care and education, more effective regulation of the banking industry and reduction of military spending.   In addition, they call for electoral reform in Spain to limit the hegemony of two political parties, a factor especially important in a country divided into significantly autonomic regions.

The Indignants Movement is being often compared to the protest of 1968, as it is a spontaneous reply to a crisis and poor state of the country, theoretically it has no established leaders, and it’s program seems generic. As the commentator has noticed  in the article ‘Europe’s most earnest protestors’ in the mid-July issue of ‘The Economist’ – the greatest leverage of this movement is its popularity and social support the protests have gained. Protesters’ arguments may not be specific but they convey the general mood – disappointment, anger and outrage. According to the polls, in summer 2011, there was 80% support rate  for the Indignants Movement in Spain.

The name of the movement comes from the book ’Indignez-vous’ (‘Time for Outrage’) by the French author, Stephane Hessel. The book has been sold in 3,5 million copies, translated into dozen or so languages, including Spanish edition published in March. In his essay Hessel urges the French to express anger and indignation, just at it happened in case of French Resistance during World War II. He claims that today the main reasons to revolt and be outraged are the deepening division between the poor and the rich, the conduct towards illegal immigrants, limitations on independent press and insufficient attempts to maintain and develop French health care system. What has begun in Spain having  a French book as an inspiration, has been transferred north. Not only did the French buy the book in bulk amounts, but also symphatized with the Spanish Indignants and their postulates.

September 17th, Wall Street

It is hard to determine the influence of the Arab Spring and Spanish Indignants on the Occupy Wall Street protest in the United States. It is however safe to say that the Arab and European movements acted as prototypes for subsequent events in the US. People in America are protesting against the deepening gap between the rich and the poor, high unemployment, the greed and the corruption of political and financial elites, and the excessive influence of financial corporations over government decisions. They also blame the financial classes for the financial crisis in 2008. The protesters’ slogan is ‘We are the 99%’ and it refers to the vast concentration of wealth among the top 1% of the richest Americans.

The social support data are inconsistent, but almost all polls indicate that the majority of respondents are in favour of the movement. According to the survey conducted for the NBC and the ‘Wall Street Journal’ in October 2011, 37% of respondents supports the Occupy Wall Street movement. Another survey conducted for CBS News and the ‘New York Times’ shows the support rate of 43%. The popularity of the movement is probably increased by the support given by famous politicians, businessmen and celebrities like Susan Sarandon, Mark Ruffalo and Michael Moore.

The movement is being criticized in Republican circles. The conservatists, lead by the political commentator Erick Ericssson, in answer to the ‘We are 99%’ slogan, have launched the blog called ‘We are 53%’, referring to the 53% of Americans, who work hard, take responsibility for themselves and pay taxes. The contributors to the blog are referring to traditional American values like work ethics and self-reliance and criticize the protesters from Wall Street for being lazy whiners avoiding work and responsibility.

The Occupy Wall Street movement is loosely associated with the Idignants from Puerta del Sol, it arouses more controversy in American society, but it expresses the same tendency that is present in Europe – people are sick and tired of the current economic and politic situation, weary of the financial sector domination and fed up with the helplessness of the governing bodies in the face of the crisis.

November 15, all over the world

The Occupy Wall Street movement is, at least till now, limited to the US – the activity of the Idignants, on the contrary is spreading throughout the world. In response to the widespread support from various cities from many countries, the Spanish Indignants have published on the Democracia Real Ya! platform an appeal to all the displeased all over the world for solidarity with the movement urging people to enter the streets on 15th October to show the political and financial elites that it is not only the Spanish who say ‘no’ to the government. As a result, on 15th of October, exactly five months after the beginning of the protests on Puerta del Sol, demonstrations took place in more than 950 cities in 82 countries. The demonstrations were organized via the abovementioned website and mailing list and (or rather first and foremost) via social networking sites – mainly Facebook and Twitter. As in case of Arab Spring the new media proved to be an invaluable ally to the protesters. The biggest demonstration in October took place in Madrid and gathered more than half a million participants. Although the organizers of the protests have many times emphasized that marches and demonstrations should be peaceful,  the protests did not go without unpleasant incidents like injuries of policemen and protesters (e.g. more than 130 people were hurt in Rome), which have led to arrests.

The representatives of the Spanish Indignants avoid naming themselves the initiators or the fathers of the protests, they also emphasize the egalitarian nature of the movement by consistently avoiding indicating individual leaders. They often claim that the fathers of the resolution, were in fact the young people from Tunisia and Egypt, as one of the Idignants have told the ‘Dziennik’ newspaper: ‘It was them, who had ignited the spark, we have only blown the fire’. The Indignants movement consists of primarily young people, frequently university graduates, who have no views for employment despite having higher education.

The movement also has the support of the retired, the unemployed and the employees displeased with the terms of their employment. The scale and the pace in which the protests are spreading throughout the world raised eyebrows of the commentators gaining their attention as a phenomenon of an unseen scale. They claim that they frankly have not witnessed anything like that before.

The governing elites and the financial sector need to deal with the actual economic crisis, they also need to react accordingly to the protest of  dissatisfied citizens. In this case it is not just a bunch of protesters or  a spontaneous yet short-lived outburst of frustration; it seems that this time it is gradually more organized, grass-root supported movement uniting people from different countries under the slogans of authentic democracy and development opportunity for each and every citizen. How politicians in democratic countries will react to the  protests determines their fate on the political scene in the upcoming future. Election results in Spain, which ended in spectacular defeat of the socialists, confirm that argument. The Indignants are not naïve slackers, they are often well-educated people, with immense awareness of politics and economics. Their arguments may seem generic or idealistic, but there is no doubt that they bring hope for improvement and the bigger the scale and the more coordinated the activities become the bigger the hopes.

Translation: Agnieszka Ścieszka

Article originally published on the portal www.stosunki.pl

Is the government building by its arrogance a generational experience that young Poles lack? Perhaps, from the passive generation Side by Side, we are becoming a very active ANTI generation.

If you look back to 2011 – the year of revolution in which young people have played first fiddle – from Tahrir Square to the Occupy Wall Street movement, it can be concluded that young Poles missed the moment. It is difficult today for young people in Poland to catch ‘Revolution’ for many reasons. Since we were little, we have been told that someone else won the freedom for us and the only thing we can do is to do something practical with it -  the best idea is to invest in ourselves and increase GDP. In this mood the young generation describes the Michał Boni’s (Polish Minister of Administration and Digitization) report the “Young 2011″, which, as I wrote here, shows us as a generation of softies – who joyfully trade freedom for little stability – in the name of an iPhone, work in a corporation and holidays in Turkey. In these rising material and lifestyle aspirations, the “Young 2011″ report sees the opportunity to build a new model of Polish communalism. It does not see the potential in the young to rebel, because rebellion is not worth-while for us.
The creators of the report, while describing “the youth” keep forgetting about one thing – to go beyond the digit, outside the Warsaw’s parlour and give voice to those who they describe.

So “the young” spoke. Welcome to the real world.

And here on the street just turns out, that contrary to the assumptions that “stupid audience will swallow it all” (Kisielewski -  Polish writer, publicist, composer and politician), however, there are things that can piss us off – and it is not the lack of work or earning 1200PLZ. It is the overwhelming arrogance of power.

The Side by Side generation speaks out.

Let’s do it by turns. The ethnographic research (about which more can be read here) gives us a picture, as opposed to the wishful thinking of the Boni’s report, that the generation is not willing to co-create Poland, about which the authors of the “Young 2011” report dream so much. Young Poles with whom I spoke, live rather Side by Side. They have no expectations from the country. They know that their country has little to offer. They don’t give a fig about their country. But they also hope that the state will leave them alone. They do not see the point of rebellion, they are not ANTI. A sense of historical injustice, so popular among our peers in the West, is not present in them (in us). There is also no brotherhood, community and willingness to go beyond, which are necessary to create a social movement. Up to some point.
Because it’s all changing in front of our eyes.

When the Side by Side generation becomes ANTI.

We are witnessing something we have considered as impossible since now. The generation of egoists, the generation of 1200, the generation that lives Side by Side just take to the streets of Polish cities. And it is not to defend work and pay, but to defend the freedom of the Internet. The government by its actions in an amazing way stimulated the young Poles to civic activity. One would like to say “well done” and write a manual on how to create active citizens in 24 hours. The government by its arrogance is building the generational experience we, young Poles, lack – from the passive Side by Side generation, we are becoming the active ANTI generation. It is amazing that the arrogance of the authorities makes us able to take to the streets – not in defence of a clearly defined self-interest – jobs, wages, money – we know the government will not take care about that for us. The time when the government enters into what we recognize as our own playground of freedom is already one step too far.

Translation: Kamila Kwiecień

We have to come to grips with the unemployment problem among young people if we do not want to lose hope for the better future of hundreds of thousands of citizens of this country, and not to lose our hope in them.

Unemployment among youths is quickly becoming a more serious social and economic problem in Poland and in a lot of other European countries, Spain for example. As “Gazeta Wyborcza” and its text about so-called NEETs (not in employment, education or training) say, “according to International Labour Organization, last year 23.7% of people between the age of 15 and 24 were unemployed in Poland, which adds up to 250,000 people”.

Together with the crisis, the situation of young people entering the labour market is still getting worse. As far as during prosperity the situation in Poland was changing to an employee’s (who was able in some trades at least, to look for a job by any possible means) advantage, in the period of slowdown the new graduates are condemned, especially within some bigger companies, to the persistent looking for a job, which ends in either finding a job under one’s qualifications (often on the border of financial independence) or the resignation and vegetation close to one’s parents, doing some odd jobs. Apart from the personal drama, unemployment has a very negative influence on economy. Eurofound researches, as the same text in “Gazeta Wyborcza” states, are estimating that one NEETs costs a tax-prayer 37,000 zloty every year, which means 5 million euro yearly, about 1,5% GDP, quite a lot in comparison to the European Union average.

Reasons of status quo

One of the status quo causes is, undoubtedly, the education system, which does not prepare pupils and students afterwards to come to grips with “the authentic world”. The years of education, especially if the parents’ education values do not force their children to connect learning with working, range from carefree laziness to  intensive cramming, only from time to time they are connected with the authentic self-development. Unfortunately, in most cases during the crash with the market realities none of those attitudes gives, carefully speaking, a specifically high rate of return. Changing the way of teaching at school and university, and adaptation of the 19th century institutions to the 21st century needs is a gigantic undertaking, which is indispensable if we count on the fact that Poles should be more than only assembly plant workers or employees of Chinese corporations.

Solutions needed now

Before we carry out a total system change, we should begin with the temporary actions, we do not have time to lose. First of all, we have to create an occupational counselling service, which will be accessible both for secondary school students (before they decide what subjects they will do at their high school exams and for what faculty at university they will apply) and for students, who finally will have a place, when they find not only available jobs, internships or trainings offers in Poland, but also the professional advice for their occupational competences, people who will be able to help them in the conscious forming their career. Career offices of universities do not fulfill do that duty – they offer other places for keeping the unnecessary and unprocessed information, which is served by not very useful university administration workers. In such a career office a university or secondary school student could familiarize himself both with what in reality the job in the definite trade depends on – thanks, for instance, to the research in the particular firms (what idea about work in advertising can even the most creative humanist, who has never gained any experience even in copywriting, have) or together with the expected demand on the stock market for a particular specialization, while he will be finishing his studies (here, again, extensive research is needed). The information about the amount of money the graduates from each faculties earn (and in what professions)  and the predictions of the changes in those earnings in the future are also important.

Businessmen, as well as students and universities, will be interested in such places, which let them understand each other and adjust their expectations and behaviour, the last two being especially important.  Such an intermediary causes that a student, who is busy with learning, does not have to visit dozens of firms, and a businessman who is busy earning money does not to have spend half of his time at the university. A secondary school student needs reliable information (and universities, unfortunately, do not secure it for them) about his possible future, which depends on the faculty at university he chooses, and a student needs a support in the soft switch, instead of the brutal crash, from the carefree reading time, parties and examinations, to the demanding world of projects, deadlines and Excel tables.

We seriously have to accept this challenge if we do not want to lose hope for the better future of young citizens of this country, who are still living in the carefree unawareness (“Beautiful moment, do not pass away!”), and not to lose our faith in them. In the end someone will have to earn money for our pension, even when we spend the retirement in Ciechocinek, not in Barbados, and pay for the soft pillows for us, which will be pushing nearer to our hurting lower backs by home help.

Translation: Milena Dawidzionek

Old standing stereotypes become reinforced in public by both the attitude of politicians and the public words. Such lines show revival of constructs “treacherous, unreliable Polish guy” and “stubborn Lithuanian guy that may be prostrated by force only” that were at place in early 20^th century. These constructs come in combination with enslaving nationalist rhetoric that denies a human freedom. In this way the modern Lithuanian society is brought back step by step to the ancient fight between nationalisms. While striving to slow the process down, one should first of all get deep knowledge of the confronting parties and more thoroughly examine the oppugnant narratives.

About stereotypes

Cognition and perception of the past comes through constructs – symbolic images that are strengthened by research and stories. The constructs that are, in our opinion, too stiff or “tough” and that prevent the community from perceiving the ever-changing reality and understanding each other, usually are called stereotypes. The same thing may be understood as a symbolic form which is necessary in order to understand the history by one person and as a dangerous to society stereotype that must be destroyed by another person. In any event community life is mustered by means of common constructs, thus it may not exist without the stereotypes. Still stereotypes in different cultures may exist in a variety of forms and they may take a variety of roles. Free and polylogical society that enjoys a living historical tradition will not attribute an excessive importance to the stereotypes. It will rather strive to compare and critically assess them and run a detailed questioning. The living tradition may be compared to a swift river – stereotypes that rest on the bottom of the river become polished by the stream and lose their sharp corners and cutting edges. Society that lacks intellectual freedom and has “enslaved mind” usually loses its living tradition, as well. Dehydrated and canonised tradition becomes replaced by one or another single ideology and a mosaic of the past becomes broken and collected anew to be line with it. In such case historical stereotypes are not polished by the stream. Contrary, they become even more sharpened by community “masons” to better suit ideological fights of the particular period.

What relation of the tradition and the historical stereotype do we have today in Lithuania? It seems that this relation is quite controversial. Lithuanian society, by gaining more and more intellectual freedom, is at the beginnings of finding a connection with broad, complex and polylogical tradition of the country. It is at the outset of perceiving its entirety. Such path of retrieving the tradition is not an easy one – it demands intellectual activity and attempts of creative memory. When confronting the broken historical mosaic of the very own country it is much easier to grab one or another more striking piece of glass and press it in the arm to the blood. Such behaviour is frequent in modern Lithuania and neighbouring countries. Today it may even become a definition of relations between Lithuanian and Polish people. Old standing stereotypes become reinforced in public by both the attitude of politicians and the public words. Such lines show revival of constructs “treacherous, unreliable Polish guy” and “stubborn Lithuanian guy that may be prostrated by force only” that were at place in early 20^th century. These constructs come in combination with enslaving nationalist rhetoric that denies a human freedom. In this way the modern Lithuanian society is brought back step by step to the ancient fight between nationalisms. While striving to slow the process down, one should first of all get deep knowledge of the confronting parties and more thoroughly examine the oppugnant narratives.

About stories

To make the context clear I would like to present two stories that I heard back in 1988. A meeting of Justas Vincas Paleckis, who was the instructor of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, with the soviet intelligentsia that took place at the House of Writers’ Union. The officer, who has recently returned from a diplomatic mission in western countries, told he was surprised by instigations “to remove the soviet army” that used to occur in Lithuania and with undisguised patriotic thrill he asked “do you know, what would happen then?” After measuring the silent intelligentsia with his eyes the former soviet diplomat offered an answer himself: “the very next day Polish army would enter Vilnius”. The second story I heard from Marcelijus Martinaitis, the poet and member of the Initiative Group of Sąjūdis (the Reform Movement of Lithuania). Late at night he went to calm down his neighbours in a collective garden. These were Polish-speaking villagers, who “having got warning from a reliable source” shut their door and kept waiting for the pogrom by “people of Lithuanian Sąjūdis”.

A part of Lithuanian political and academic society today keep telling a story about aspirations of Polish people that constitute a threat to the State of Lithuania. Even the NATO membership cannot protect Lithuania from such aspirations, as imperialistic attempts of the Polish people are supported by the USA: In military terms we are disarmed and transferred to Poland

[1]. According to this story, Polish people that reside in Lithuania and demand today more rights, participate in a historic Polish march for Vilnius. Similar to their grandparents and grand-grandparents a hundred years ago, they strive to tear Vilnius region apart from the territory of Lithuania: the general Żeligowski started the enslavement of Vilnius region by sword; modern polonist-man want to finish his quest by word; <…> Requirement to write Polish-adapted Lithuanian surnames of Polish-speaking residents of Vilnius region in Polish letters is indecorous and aimed at polonisation – final denationalization of previously occupied part of Lithuania[2]. The Lithuanian citizens, who share Polish culture and want to write their surnames of Lithuanian origin in Polish letters, may be treated as aliens[3] – a warning comes from Lithuanian politicians. This Lithuanian story contains also a predictable course of surmounting the Polish threat – gradual restoration of Lithuanian spirit in the residents of Vilnius region, who have turned Polish due to historic disasters. This implication of the story is understood by Lithuanian people that share Polish culture, as well. They start considering the government of the state as a threatening force, from which they should protect their Polish identity, and the neighbouring Poland – as a reliable protector of their own self. However, a story offered to them by the Poland is in many aspects enslaving, denying independency of a person and demanding strict ideological obedience, as well.

The narrative full of Polish stereotypes was published in her article No Sign of Brotherhood Left by the Polish journalist Maja Narbutt a year ago. When staying at the Lithuanian Parliament in January of 1991 she admired the Lithuanian fight for freedom. After two decades Maja Narbutt revealed a true face of stubborn Lithuanians: Until today we displayed sentiments in our relations with Lithuania – we spoke of beautiful common history and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But blaze as seen by our people was considered to be a shadow by Lithuanian politicians. It turned out that paradigm of Lithuanian patriotism rested on anti-Polish ideas. And this situation occurred due to the fact that Lithuania is still under the influence of Russian special services. The entire Lithuanian system of education is predetermined against the Polish people – it strives to turn Polish children into Pavlik Morozov type of kids, i.e. traitors of their parents and nation. Example of such Lithuanian actions – an essay “Liberation of Vilnius from Polish Occupation” by a student of Lithuanian gymnasium in Šalčininkai (mother of this girl – a Lithuanian lady who teaches the Lithuanian language). According to Narbutt, the gymnasium student, who has Polish name and surname, became the traitress of her own people, because she did not consent to the match of Lucjan Żeligowski to Vilnius[4]. Thus a man, who has a Polish name and lives in Lithuania of the 21^st century, may not question decisions made by Jósef Piłsudski one hundred years ago. Such man becomes a national degenerate, if he publicly expresses opinion common to Oskaras Milašius, Mykolas Römeris or Józef Mackiewicz. One should remember also another idea of the Narbutt’s story – brotherhood of Polish and Lithuanian people is possible only if Lithuanians assess the beautiful common history in the same way as Polish people, when they see the blaze of glory of the history in the same things as the sons and daughters of Poland. If Lithuanians see shadows instead of blaze, it means that Russian secret service has its hand on them, the same attitude was shared in 19^th century.

It is obvious that further to the logical sequence made by Narbutt, some earnest expert of the Lithuanian language might remind her of the Lithuanian origin from the Narbutas family and reproach that by such an article “the journalist with the Lithuanian name” betrays her ancestors and Lithuania. Thus the conflicting national stories of Polish and Lithuanian people in a paradoxical way merge into a single circle and demand that modern man makes no attempt to cross this circle, but rather joins the inner or outer crowd. Such composition of the closed circle today is designed by rhetoric of the the top ranking Polish and Lithuanian officials, as well. Dalia Grybauskaitė, the President of Lithuania, speaks loudly about her doubt of loyalty of the local residents who share Polish culture[5]. Bronisław Komorowski, the President of Poland, publicly resents the stubborn “Lithuanian she goat”, which has no intention to approach any cart at her own will[6]. In this way the leader of the neighbouring state recalls an image, which used to be attributed by Polish people to Lithuanians one hundred years ago – back in 1907 Mykolas Römeris, who issued a study on the Lithuanian national revival, faced criticism in the Polish-oriented press of Vilnius. They said that he looks like a tree that leaned himself and allowed every Lithuanian goat to climb it[7].

About recourses

Is there any way to leave this intersection of the conflicting national ideologies? One way was proposed by a group of Lithuanian intellectuals in a public letter before the Easter of 2011. By speaking in favour of the Christian love between Lithuanian and Polish people this group encouraged the fellow citizens to change the attitude towards the past of the country and resign from the “faulty” construction of the history: a chauvinist version of the history, which treats the common history of Lithuania and Poland as “the lost ages”, distorts a vision of the past of the state, denies and libels the common spiritual, political and cultural heritage of both nations[8]. Thus, when striving to restore friendly relations between Lithuania and Poland, to dissipate distrust that Polish people lately shared against their historic allies, Lithuanians, according to authors of the letter, should meet the requirement of Maja Narbutt – begin construe and perceive their past so that they see the blaze in the things, which are seen as such by the historic story, dominating in the Polish society.

One may accept an opinion that negative assessment of common past of Lithuanian and Polish people, which survived in the modern Lithuania, should be analysed and reviewed in critical manner. However, it is difficult to consent to the statement that a reserved or negative approach of a part of Lithuanians towards the history of relations of both nations is chauvinist – based on national hate. Which Lithuanians should be treated “chauvinists”? Is it Vytautas, who sought to become the king of Lithuania against the will of Polish politicians?  Is it Albertas Goštautas, who supported creation of Lithuanian historical story that was favourable to Polish people in the early 16^th century? Is it Mikalojus Radvila the Black, who accused Polish politicians of an attempt to involve Lithuania in a non-equitable union? Is it Simonas Daukantas, who questioned a benefit of the Lublin Union to his country? Is it “Lithuanian patriots” Jonas Basanavičius and Vincas Kudirka? Is it Lithuanian peasants-volunteers, who protected with a weapon the restored Republic of Lithuania not only from the Bolsheviks, but from the “brothers from Poland”, as well? Is it Mykolas Römeris, who reprehended Jósef Piłsudski for occupation of Vilnius? Is it the academician Zigmas Zinkevičius, who conducted a research of origin of the surnames of Eastern Lithuanians? Isn’t the way indicated by seven Lithuanian intellectuals a proposal to “correct” the Lithuanian history in line with requirements of another ideology? Isn’t it an invitation to replace one ideological story with another one rather than opening the mind for a tradition of the country? Isn’t it a replacement of Moscow narrative with Warsaw narrative? Isn’t it a selection of pieces of destroyed mosaic of the Lithuanian past, which are pleasing to our neighbours like and which they consider to be shining, and teaching our society to admire them? Attempts of such behaviour are already at place in academic and public life of Lithuania. Isn’t such behaviour conjunctural? Can Lithuanian sincerely rejoice over the blaze of the Lublin Union together with brothers from Poland, when it was Lublin, where Lithuania lost not only half of its territory, but a part of sovereignty, as well? I wonder if Poland celebrated the union of both nations, if it was created by means of attaching Masuria and Pomerania to Lithuania and legalising only those Sejms of the Commonwealth that are formed in Vilnius at behest of the Grand Duke of Lithuania.

It is unlikely that replacement of one selective historical story with another selective one will form a reliable basis for civic coexistence of Lithuanian people speaking diverse languages and amiable concord of Lithuania and Poland. Lithuanian man, who truckles to neighbours and publicly renounces his past, will never become a reliable partner. Why should others trust the national community, which does not trust itself, and while lacking a conscious identity and harder moral backbone, only tries to assume roles that others like?

Thus, an invitation to Lithuanians to refuse a part of their past and independent historic story in the name of friendship with Polish people does not seem to be a solution.

About tradition

One of the most reliable ways to create a free community is to recover a living tradition. Today the necessity for a modern man and community to “take roots in history” and “create a conscious for the history of its dependence” that was stressed by Vytautas Kavolis and Czesław Miłosz remains of importance[9]. Continuation of an independent story of Lithuania – it is not only recognition and perception of what did the people, who considered Lithuania to be their homeland, strive for, what did they protect, what did they discuss and argue about. It is also letting their voices into the debates on current issues of the country and discussion of the future, as well as taking into account the things that are important to them. Continuation of story of Lithuania – is not only an attempt to cover cultural and political diversity of the country’s past, but also an insight into the element, which united this diversity into a complex and multi-voiced entirety – culture of Lithuania, State of Lithuania, as well as noting, which symbolic forms of the past could contribute to massing Lithuanians of different cultures into a single community of today.

Wider modern approach should help one to attribute texts in various languages and religions, as well as their authors to the Lithuanian tradition, historic story of Lithuanian people. While cherishing Simonas Daukantas, who wrote in Lithuanian language, we would alongside have Adomas Mickevičius, who stressed his nationship of Lithuania even in emigration. In 1841 Mickevičius wrote to the brother Francis from Paris: Maybe I’ll become professor without naturalisation, as I regret to cease being Lithuanian in official, state terms [mi jakoś żal przestać być Litwinem urzędownie] and don’t want to turn French[10]. Jonas Basanavičius should come in a company of Mykolas Römeris. Vytautas Kavolis and Marija Gimbutienė – with their acquaintance Czesław Miłosz. Who sees everything with his painful confession: I hate Vilnius. I’ll never come here. Everyone in this city keeps asking, who am I – Lithuanian or Polish. And I am both Lithuanian, and Polish. In fact, I am the last citizen of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[11]. These words by Miłosz result in a fundamental question: what kind of narrative will Vilnius have. Will it be enslaving, denying the diversity of Lithuanian identities and views, or fostering human freedom, protecting diversity and encouraging a dialogue of different experiences? This is an issue of the Lithuanian tradition and the relation of the present with the tradition, since modern life, if open to the old Lithuanian tradition, hearing the story of the first Republic of Lithuania – the Republic of Grand Duchy of Lithuania – would become more free, conscious and independent. Living feeling of the tradition would help to reduce the lack of self-confidence, lack of trust in its freedom and future, its self-abasement and lack of ability to act upon its own will, which is characteristic to post-colonial country. A link with polylogical story of the past would give more freedom to the present life of polylogicity, as well. Because, according to modern historians, the historic story, which construes the past as a creation of a free human being, as a space for alternatives, strengthens freedom of society. And contrary – the narrative, which depicts the past as a reality that is subject to strict rules, makes a totalitarian impact upon the present and reduces the freedom[12].

The most fundamental support of the old republican story of Lithuania was the Statute – the document, which united people of different cultures into a nation – the Lithuanian nation – for several centuries. It entrenched love and loyalty to the own Republic as the fundamental principles of public life. According to the Statute, a man of an alien nation could become a part of Lithuania and settle here only due to his merits in the particular republic and only after giving an oath to be loyal and benevolent to the State, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[13]. Thus – benevolence. Every new edition of the Statute always had a foreword by Leonas Sapiega, which created a link between the statute and republican concept of freedom, the ideal of the republic – community of free people – which was defended by Cicero. According to Sapiega, Lithuanians are most free among other nations, because they hold power and freedom in their own hands and are free to create order in the own country by their own laws[14].

Why couldn’t loyalty to freedom and the own Republic today unite different people of Lithuania into the single community? Couldn’t the road, which the tradition of the country reminds of, unite Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Polish people, Russian, Jews and other cultures into a solidary nation of Lithuania? Unite them as the successors of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania? It was back in 1989 when Miłosz wrote in the Culture (Paris): It is difficult to understand, why should people of Lithuania who speak Polish renounce this capital [heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania]. <…> Instead of treating themselves as power brothers, who are separated from the Polish nation and strive to survive in an unfriendly environment, they have the right to claim back the pride of masters, who live in their own land, and even look at those who live near Vistula with certain sense of advantage. However, a precondition exists – they should stop being a conservative group with poor creativity and start bringing up people, who know the heritage, which is not the heritage of Poland, but the heritage of the historic Lithuania[15]. Approximately in 1990 Miłosz translated Tautiška giesmė (the National Hymn) by Vincas Kudirka into the Polish language. Perhaps he expected that citizens, who share Polish culture, will sing the hymn of Lithuania thus proving their loyalty both to the mother tongue and to Lithuania[16]. Most possibly, in this way he intended to contribute to the project of Lithuanian future – the project proposed by him. In 1992 he stated: As the main local inhabitants, rather than immigrants or colonists, the Polish-Lithuanian people [Polako-Litwini](similar to Swedish-Finish people) must create for themselves a program of activity of loyal citizens of the new state[17].

Of course, policy of the state of Lithuania must be favourable to development of such programs by Polish, Byelorussian or Russian people. Lithuanian politicians, who are loyal to the historic traditions of the country, should declare and protect the idea that Polish, Byelorussian, Jewish and other local cultures are a part of Lithuanian heritage, which must be treasured and this heritage will always be cherished. The free Republic may not reject this idea even in situations, where a part of people of one or another culture refuse establish more close link between the fate of their own or or their children with political community of the particular country, where they renounce of the possibility of common story of Lithuania that was proposed by Miłosz. According to the current leaders of the Electoral Action of Polish in Lithuania, identity of the citizen of Lithuanian is not compatible with identity of the Polish man in Lithuania. In reply to the question, why Polish people in Lithuania could not study a few subjects at school in the official language of the state, Waldemaras Tomaszewskis, the head of this party, explained: You are free to choose – if you want, you may study. Your children may study even history of England. Maybe they succeed and enter the Cambridge, become citizen of Great Britain[18]. Thus, common course of the Lithuanian language and literature, history of Lithuania, that are taught to all citizens of the state, would purportedly turn Polish people in Lithuania the informal citizens of Lithuania and create a too tight connection with the state and culture of Lithuania. And this is unacceptable to them. While following Stasys Šalkauskis we have to admit that even such a posture of the person must be respected in a free country[19]. Much more complicated and still unanswered is the question, how should political community of the country act in the event that political coexistence is denied not by solitary persons, but by a party that speaks in the name of the entire cultural community and has no intention to tolerate other opinion or other civic posture within this community? It seems that the Republic, in order not to lose its meaning, should always consistently protect freedom of human consciousness, the right of every person to make decisions without any ideological or political pressure, but alongside remind of the duty of the citizen to follow the laws. The free Republic, in order to survive, will strive in any event to be open to the entirety of its past, will make attempts to continue the independent story of the country that forms the ground for free existence. It will seek that this story would sooner or later create a link of solidarity between the majority of people of Lithuania and foster their roots in common history of the motherland, and that historic stereotypes that exist in the society become polished by the stream of tradition.

* The article is based on the speech given at the scientific-practical conference “Surmounting the Historical Stereotypes as a Measure of Neutralisation of Ethnic Tensions” that was held by the Ministry of Culture on 25 August 2011 in Vilnius.

[1]Rimantas Varanauskas, “Ozolas warns about the threats that Poland represents to Lithuania”, in: www.Alfa.lt, 2011.04.13.

[2] Zigmas Zinkevičius, „About transcription of surnames in Polish letters“, in: www.voruta.lt, 2011.07.24.

[3] V. Landsbergis: if Polish people want Polish surnames in their passports, they may be treated as aliens, www.DELFI.lt, 2011.09.03.

[4] Maja Narbutt, “Po braterstwie nie został ślad”, in: Rzeczpospolita, 2010.10.26.

[5] D. Grybauskaitė: one tries to depart from the principle that minorities must be loyal to the state, www.DELFI.lt, 2011.09.13.

[6] Bronislaw Komorowski: “Lithuanian goat” shall not approach any cart, www.DELFI.lt, 2011.09.08.

[7] “Autobiography of Mykolas Römeris”, in: Lietuvių atgimimo istorijos studijos(Study of the History of Lithuanian Revival), vol. 13, Mykolas Römeris, Vilnius: Saulabrolis, 1996, p. 215.

[8] Intellectuals on the Lithuanian-Polish Relations: We Lived, We Live, We Will Live Together, www.lrytas.lt, 2011.04.11. the open address was signed by Antanas Gailius, Danutė Gailienė, Irena Vaišvilaitė, Alvydas Jokubaitis, Paulius V. Subačius, the priest Julius Sasnauskas, Rimvydas Petrauskas.

[9] Vytautas Kavolis, Nužemintųjų generacija. Egzilio pasaulėjautos eskizai (Generation of the Humbled. Sketches of Exhile Emotional Attitude), Cleveland, 1968, p. 58.

[10] Adam Mickiewicz, Dzieła, vol. XV, Listy, part II, drafted by Stanisław Pigoń, Warszawa, „Czytelnik“, 1955, p. 391.

[11] These words of Cz. Miłosz were said in Vilnius in 2000, in a conversation with Irena Veisaitė, who gave her kind permission to the author to publish them.

[12] Jörn Rüsen, History. Collection of Historic Works, Vilnius, 2007, p. 456-457.

[13] Statut Vjalikaga Knjastva Litouskaga 1588, Minsk, 1989, p. 118-119.

[14] Ibidem, p. 47-48.

[15] Czesław Miłosz, “O konflikcie polsko-litewskim”, in: Kultura, Paryż, 1989, Maj, p. 9.

[16] Viktorija Daujotytė, Mindaugas Kvietkauskas, Lietuviškieji Česlovo Milošo kontekstai (Lithuanian contexts of Czesław Miłosz) , Vilnius, 2011, p. 106-111.

[17] “Litwa i Polska. Ankieta ‘Znaku’”, in: Znak, Kraków, 1992, Nr. 442 (3).

[18] W. Tomaszewski: It is you who should integrate in this country, www.lrytas.lt, 2011.04.06.

[19] Stasys Šalkauskis, „Lietuvių tauta ir jos ugdymas“ (“Lithuanian Nation and its Upbringing”), in: Stasys Šalkauskis, Raštai (Collection of Works), Vilnius, 1995, vol. IV, p. 322-323.

It is worth noticing that just few days ago police evicted another demonstration that has been residing in front of British Parliament for the last ten years – the antiwar protest, whose encampment dates back to pre Afghanistan times. The latter one have ceased to attract public interest and media attention ages ago. With the few old anti- war posters and half of the working tent it has became rather an act of desperation and a tourist curiosity rather than a serious political action. Easy to ignore, easy to dismiss. While Britain has been entering new wars flawlessly.Such an abrupt end of the St Paul’s protest (that follows the eviction of the camp in Zucotti Park in New York) might actually give the Occupy Movement new fuel for even more robust political action. In a way City of London Corporation could not pay the protesters a bigger favor. Occupy has attracted great media attention and inspired an important public debate – perhaps the most important in the West in a generation. Yet, no – one believed obviously believed that it had tools to reform current capitalism. So, when do you finish the protest when your goals cannot be met? What do you do when the cameras switch off? What do you do when the public is bored to death with the topic? Occupy, like any other street protest, certainly risked loosing the momentum and just becoming a caricature of its own. Now, the forced eviction is a brilliant end to the protest. The sort of end that allows to call a moral victory! Now, in this very act of the romantic defeat Occupy can reinvent itself as new political force – as a new type of movement that joins in the debate using various global, grass – root ways of acting, switching in and off from places, spaces and threads of debate.The eviction from can actually serve as a great founding element for a lasting Occupy narrative.

The decision to evict the protesters of the grounds of ‘becoming permanent’ serves also as important case in the debate about the right of the protest itself in the democratic society. This week’s decision of High Court brings the certain limit to citizens rights to protest. Certainly in the UK. So, one must ask today – when do we have the right to protest? Only, when it does not disturb anyone? When it allows to continue with the business as usual? I used to think that it was in the very nature of the protest to bring the disturbances. But the Daily Mail summed it up for me today: ‘If protesters demonstrate for responsible capitalism, they should be also ready to protest in a responsible way’. Point taken. Next time protesters should also stop displaying poverty and dress more nicely so it does not disturb the right – wing press aesthetics.

But then, who am I to dare tell other people’s stories? How can I escape from a comfortable position of a friendly anthropologist that comes and just go? Can I?

[...]

In 2007 I visited Israel/Palestine. Coming from Poland when the memory about the ghettos and forced segregation is so vivid in and lived almost daily, at least in the circles I am part of, it was very disturbing to see the „separation line” between the West Bank and Israel and just accept it. Being attached to the Jewish history and memory about the Jewish past it was really difficult to come to terms with what was happening at the checkpoints. Remembering streets of Jewish Kazimierz district in Krakow, being brought up on the stories from the Warsaw ghetto, it was really difficult to cope with the Israeli occupation, the settlements, the „Palestinian – free” highways and the ways in which the remaining Palestinians were forced to live as the second class citizens in their own homeland. „Security reasons’ seemed to be the answer that was supposed to silence all the difficult questions. Months later I realised that the village where we stayed at my friends’ house at the Mediterranean sea north of Tel- Aviv used to be a Palestinian village. My Israeli friends were rather surprised to learn that we went to Ramallah few days earlier. Later they admitted that they used to have „Arab” friends in the past – not any longer. Months later I realized I was able to see Negef, Jaffa, Safed, Golan and all beautiful hills that were now a forbidden land to majority of Palestinian, including my Palestinian friends.

I want to tell stories of Palestinian exiles as I feel I somehow owe it to them. I think it comes from the sense of bitter awareness as a Pole and as a European about our own history and the need to „talk back” to my own history. It comes from the shame about how „Muslims’ today become Jews in the European discourse and how we perhaps do not learn enough from our own past. It comes as a sense of guilt that perhaps I did not do enough to save our Jews so perhaps we should know better this time to save Palestinians. It comes from the nostalgia about my country multicultural past that is for long gone and in the hope that in Europe we will remember where does our richness come from and that it does not come from building the fortress. Palestinians matter not because they are a sad epilogue to the Jewish recent history. They matter, because they are people, one of us, living next door and still longing for home.

Liberté!: The poll of the Euro- barometers indicate that we are the country of one of the greatest number of euro- enthusiasts in the whole Union. To what extent is it the effect of our identification with the ideals that are represented by the European Union or which lie at its heart, and to what extent only a consequence of being the beneficiaries of the European financial support, perceptible for instance in the form of roads and the motorways that are being built?

I think there are at least three sources of the euro- enthusiasm, which truly do not die out in the Polish society. Firstly, it is realisation of the aspirations. We belong to the Latin civilization, traditionally identified with the Western civilization. The cradle of this Western civilization was the Western Europe, of which we, Western Slavs, were a part. The second source is what you mentioned in your question, namely: ”what are the benefits?” ; well, there are a lot of them, and that can be seen. The structural funds or cohesion funds – they both strengthen Poland. We are a very strong net beneficiary. All the people see that a peculiar jump of civilization takes place here. Even the farmers, who were the most euro- sceptical before our accession, now are euro- enthusiastic because they are given grants, which are actually quite controversial, conserving our archaic structure. But there is also the third source which should be remembered, which is the remembrance of what had been said by the Pope. He uttered one sentence, which – in my opinion – is basically the whole socially- political doctrine: “from the Union of Lublin to the European Union”. In this sentence the Pope John Paul II included two things. Firstly, the fact that our place is in the European Union, which was extremely important before the referendum. Secondly, it is a reminder that we were the forerunners of uniting Europe under the common reign. Together with doctor Xymena Bukowska we have conducted research on the sense of social identity, which show that about one fourth of the young Poles feels simultaneously two types of identity: the European and Polish.

More and more political scientists point to the fact that the Union experiences crisis. On account of this, our sense of euro- enthusiasm or choking with the European integration can be a threat, when the financial structure changes and when we will be given less support from the Union’s budget. Will the ideals turn out to be strong enough then to hold this enthusiasm for the united Europe? The question is so reasonable that in the recent years the Union – instead of citizens of Europe – treats us more as European consumers, reducing its role to being a product with a blue label with twelve stars, in the form of cheaper roaming, the airlines’ passengers’ protection, better protection of consumers’ rights. The ideological base is dying out, similarly to threat of totalitarianism, war. Is there a threat that when we look at the Union from the consumer’s point of view, we will stop identifying with it?

I entirely agree with the thesis included in your question. Future of the Union depends on whether the European citizens or two types of identity will come into being. However, it does not exclude being the citizen of somebody’s own motherland. Europe’s and European Union’s future depends on whether the citizens will come into being, or whether they will be substituted by consumers and only business will count. When the business in endangered, it will naturally result in the escape to national egoisms. However, if the European citizens come into being, also values would count, including the liberal values. That can be a bond which will enable Europe and the European Union to survive and for example – get by with the economic crises. It should be noticed that the sense of European citizenship is very shallow and weakly rooted in the societies of different membership countries, because when the financial crisis appeared, the first reaction was to escape to national egoisms.

Which means nationalization of the European politics…

Yes. I think that the essential phenomenon for Europe’s future would be whether the sense of European citizenship would develop or not. I do not know whether it happens. No one knows that. But in Poland we are still before that change. Because when we talk about Europe or about the European Union in Poland, scarcely do we use the name which should be natural, the name “we”. Instead of that we use the name “they” is it not true? It means that we feel in the European Union a little bit like a new person in a class. There are still “they” and “I”, and I am not the part of that class.

Which means that we do not really feel the sense of deciding together, rather perceiving ourselves as the recipient …

I would say something contrary, that we decide together on a much higher level than we think. But we could decide in even higher degree, if we had a sense that there already are “we”, that Europe is also “we” and not “they”. As a matter of fact, it can be also seen in the political class, this relationship to the European Union. From defining precisely in the categories ”we” and entering European structures to the extent that we could be really the co- hosts of the project called the European Union, to for example what said and is still saying the vice- Prime Minister Pawlak, that “Brussels should be maximally squeezed”, because Brussels means “they”.

However, this tendency happens frequently among the governments of the other countries, suggesting that “whatever wrong happens, it is not caused by us”, it had been imposed by Brussels.

But in Poland there appeared a peculiar paradoxical phenomenon, which is not probably seen in any other European country. Namely, the Poles trust the European Commission more than the Polish Government.

What  had been also seen and raised by the anti- European right- wing feature writers, when the gas agreement had been signed with Russia, and the European Commission defended our interests stronger than our government.

Yes, that is true.

The last question concerning the European issues. Last year in “The Washington Post” I found the article by Charles Kupchan, a professor of the international relationships on Georgetown University. He wrote quite a terrifying line which opens this text: The European Union is dying – not with a dramatic or sudden death, but so slowly and monotonously that one day we will look through the Atlantic looking at that project of the European integration, which was something self- evident for us during the last 50 years, that has stopped being this ( . . . ) the result of which will be a return to the conception of an individual existence of the united nations for the geo- political marginalization.

It reminds me of Mark Twain’s saying: “ the rumours about my death are very exaggerated”. In this case such ominous prophecies are – in my view – well- established, neither in the activities of the main actors of the European Union, nor in what can be predicted in a rational, short- distance way. Certainly, there will be tensions in the European Union. The Union is a living organism, and if there were no tensions it would mean that the organism was dead. The tensions do not exist solely on the cemeteries. The tensions will be huge at constructing the budget. The beginnings of construction of this budget for the next years fall in the Polish presidency, which gives the presidency an unusually great importance. And there are “we”, is it not that true? This is the category “we” which has been mentioned earlier. If this budget is constructed as a pro-developmental budget, which is to assure the strategic aims included in the Lisbon Treaty, which means competitiveness of the Union towards the USA, China, Japan and the innovative character, then I think it would be a good base to  going a step further in the integration.

But on the other side we observe the increase of nationalisms in Europe, parties like True Finns, Jobbik in the Hungary or tendencies appearing even in Poland…

It should be looked at a little bit like on waves which come and go away. We should remember that in the interwar period Europe was flooded with a wave of an extreme nationalism which went away. Nowadays there appear such – maybe not waves, but at any rate symptoms of certain intensity of one’s own identity, societies in the nationalistic categories. But I do not think it could be anything more than the reaction to a very aggressive political, all- Europe’s correctness. I do not think it could give rise to a new wave of nationalism, which will move Europe’s back from to the national egoisms.

Profession: sociologist

Well, let us leave the European Union a little bit aside. Before we will go to the questions concerning Poland, I would like to ask about the profession of a sociologist in the contemporary Poland. Is it more difficult to be a sociologist of politics nowadays than ten years ago? Have those social- political processes changed and are they more difficult to be seen?

No, it is not harder. It is invariably interesting to be a sociologist of politics, because Polish politics or, more generally, Polish public life is very dynamic, difficult to predict, there is a big margin of risk of making a mistake when the development of events is being predicted.

But it is very interesting intellectually.

Was not the level of a political, intellectual debate higher several years ago? Are not in that moment, even for a sociologist, emotionalism dominating in this discourse, as well as subjects’ sketchiness which are brought up in the media, the mediatisation of politics  itself, are they not something disheartening or tiring?

It is tiring. It is disheartening. But from the academic point of view it does not stop being interesting. Nonetheless, the statement that some time ago a debate was on a higher level is hard to prove. It is because of the fact that in my opinion a debate on the most important Poland’s issues finished with the first presidential campaign, when Tymiński managed to gather, arousing pure negative emotions, support of the one fourth of the adult Poles, which was a shock for me. I did not expect that. All the most important decisions have been taken during the reformative government of Prime Minister Mazowiecki. Everything else is as if its continuation, and it has fortunately happened for Poland that those decisions have been accurately taken. Nowadays we either finish or enclose, either on the basis of those decisions, or we build on the basis of those decisions, which have built institutions and the rules of a game, treating them as a bank and a solid condition, from which we take next developmental steps. A current public debate is on a dramatically low level. In fact, it does not contribute anything new to our thinking of Poland’s future, since it is a debate resembling – to a certain extent – the debate of Kargul and Pawlak, the characters of “Sami Swoi”, which means a debate that does not bring about anything new but gets our emotions off our chest.

Does it not mean that nowadays a student of sociology, with whom a professor meets every day, needs more extended classes on political marketing and PR than classes like “political doctrines”?

No. I think that we demonize a little bit, absolutise the political marketing and PR. It is truth that in nowadays’ politics the media are present, but still, decisions which people take as citizens or do not take them at all  – shall be considered as independent decisions. People are resistant to PR. It does not mean that everyone gullibly follows a certain PR trick like a flock of sheep. The attempt to seek the second bottom behind the reality which appears at first glance lies vey often in the Polish mentality. Which, as a matter of fact, is paradoxical, since this scepticism is also food for various conspiracy theories, which even resist empirical facts, because they can be also a product of conspiracy. PR and marketing tricks do have importance, but mainly for this non-reflective part of our society, so rather not for students whom we teach doctrines, mechanisms ruling the public life. On the penultimate class, while still on the recent subject, I  asked my students to define “the real Pole”. There have appeared different definitions, which could have been very easily questioned on the basis of logically built definition. I asked them to think of and define  “the real Pole” in a way that could not be easily disputed. It turned out that such a definition cannot be formulated.

Is it important for a sociologist to be overbearing?

Yes. However, it does not mean that a sociologist does not have his/her own system of values. Certainly, s/he has. Moreover, every sociologist is also a citizen, a human being, a member of community and has got their own axiological sphere. It is not a problem. The problem appears  when they are so un- self-reflective and unable to become aware of the fact how their own values influence the object of researchers. If such a situation happens, then we are dealing with using one role to enhance the persuading function of the utterances propagated in another role. For example using the role of a sociology professor in order to raise or support, or  increase the power of political theses delivered in the role of a citizen. It is not fair.

Is then true the claim that the profession of a sociologist, evaluating Polish political debate or politics is in some sense in crisis? More and more often media are putting the sociologists in the position of the jury in the  TV show, who have to – with a short, vivid, cutting riposte – not necessary explain reality, but rather be in favour of one of the sides.

Yes, it is true that the sociologists are exposed to a temptation to act in the role of “Dance with the Stars” ’s jurors, where this dance is politics. It is really unfortunate when they restrict their professional function exclusively to that role. One of the parts of a sociologist’s mission as a scientist is also dissemination the scientific results. However, the problem lies in the fact that a certain part of sociologists  – I will not enlist their names there, but each reader, on the basis of their observation, is able to form the opinion whom I am talking about – is signing up in  the politics in a certainly biased way and becomes a court expert on a particular political option. If s/he acts in the role of a sociologist, then s/he betrays the mission.

Is not the very altering into politics by sociologists such a big problem?

No, it is not. But in that case certain two roles have to be clearly distinguished. The academic and the political ones. When politics enters to the academic workshop, then science leaves.

Translation: Anna Brzezińska (kamelia_88@wp.pl)

And each would eat  a thousand of chops,

And each would make a great effort,

They will not carry it – it’s such a weigh!

J.Tuwim, The Locomotive

Crisis of the euro zone resulted in the disappearance of all the symptoms of  euro- enthusiasm. Future of the further integration is strongly endangered, politicians and economists are pondering over the economic results of the common currency’s liquidation. The rules, which can become the first step in eradication of Schengen zone, are being discussed – almost without the reaction of the public opinion . It is worth thinking of where the Europeans are when the united Europe really needs them.

Certainly, it is not easy to find an answer to this question. It might be even impossible. Actually it is difficult to say whom we think about when we say the European. Observing the opinions that are presented in the media it could be even stated that it is a very offensive name. Are not the Europeans the contemporary Judases, selling out their motherland for Union’s pieces of silver? Are they not degenerates destructing tradition and faith in the name of death’ civilization? Well, maybe it is truth. I am not going to argue with those who do think so. It is not worth either my time or theirs. It will be enough that they accept another definition for this article.

European, which means somebody who does not exist?

I reckon it would be proper to accept that the European should feel relation with the whole Europe’s culture and the so- called European values: democracy or human rights. S/he should support the project of the united Europe. It should not be pondered over whether to put in the first place Europe or his/her country. The only thing that should be accepted is the fact that s/he sees in the united Europe a chance for the development of their motherland in the best and the most complete way. I think it is a sensible and justified plan of a minimum for the European.

When we have eventually felt joy due to the just found definition, after a while we will certainly feel uneasiness coming over us. It is easy to notice that. There is Europe, even the European Union, but the Europeans are still in scarcity. Everywhere there are only Poles, Germans, French, Italians, Spaniards, Greek … the Europeans almost do not exist. And unfortunately, the reason for that is not the abovementioned euro crisis. The lack of European identity is for the European Union a permanent feature. Since always the politicians of individual countries have been trying to take care of their business only, since always the public opinion of those countries has been supporting politics led in such a way. Maybe instead of thinking where the Europeans have hidden, we should ask why they never were there? However, before we start answering this question it is advisable to think of what the Europeans can offer Europe?

Does Europe without the Europeans exist?

A group which consists of people with a strong sense of common identity is among others a politically efficient lobby. It is the power which the chefs of governments of each membership country playing the leading role have to take into account. It is the power which can effectively control the activities of common authorities (that are frequently brushed off by the domestic media), such as the European Parliament or the European Commission. It is the power which – through putting pressure on political changes – can contribute to efficiently functioning European Union and Union’s economy in general. It is economy that is being wasted due to political decisions.

In the United States certain part of the national budget is spent on completely unnecessary things. The congressmen who want to be perceived as devoted to their region vote for the budget in exchange for including there resources for the conduction in their neighbourhood different third- class investments. To produce a similar situation in the European Union the one- seat constituencies are not needed. “Small nationalisms” are enough.

When the country is strong – like for example France – it can lead to recognizing a snail as a land fish. They do this so that French farmers could be given suitably high extra money. Another example – when a Pole runs for a prominent function, it is certain that s/he will gain full support from all Polish politicians. It is silently admitted that a Pole will always fix something for us, that it would be better for us with a Pole. Political divisions or professionalism of each candidate are of no significance. After all, it all really costs the Union.

One could find at least several similar examples. It is not about enumerating them, but proving that there is a relation between the interest of the European Union and the Europeans’ political power. Since we succeeded in disclosing that, we can now think of what prevented people from accepting the European identity.

Culture counts …

Let’s take any American TV series. The characters fly a plane form one coast to another. And these are not only touristic journeys. They visit their families, change job, look for a better place to live in. And what would turn out when we take any European TV series? Nothing. The European TV series do not really exist. There  is only BBC. There are no European media – media which would treat more seriously matters concerning Europe than from behind the filter of national business. Polish television is encouraged to broadcast movies produced in Europe by certain law regulations. When it comes to successes,  whole Union loved the Nordic detective stories. The European books to be loved still do not exist.

Although based on common foundations, Europe does not have common culture. Not to the same extent as Americans have. Almost during the same history we had two Europes, with border on the river Elbe. Wars that ravaged Europe caused rise of small nationalisms. Almost every country attempts at defending itself from “strangers”, which sometimes – like in case of France – becomes simply a characteristic feature of domestic policy. The British, who through centuries placed themselves in the position of an arbiter and guarded the balance of power on the continent are particularly euro-sceptical, but today they still do not understand the joint business which binds them with Europe, that can be found behind the English Channel. Divisions in Europe, despite unification, are still fine.

Even if the European TV series came into existence, there would be much less journeys by plane. From time to time a middle class representative will fly to see Paris, Rome, London or Madrid. It would be much worse with a journey for work. It would either turn out that the character of the TV series leaves his/her family and travels to work abroad (where s/he would not be able to talk in that language), or that s/he is a local person and protests against flooding the labour market by immigrants. It does not really fit TV series’ script. Travelling by plane in the European TV series (if they came into being) will rather not be used.

. . . politics also

But there are  no Europeans also due to more prosaic (because political) reasons. Firstly, the crisis exposed weakness of the new line- up. The international corporations and the European Union turned out to be much weaker than it had been thought, while individual countries showed their power. People who earlier saw in the Union the only chance for maintaining their position in a globalized world had a possibility to revise their views once again.

The main problem of the Union is priority given to economic issues. Even though politicians form each country do not see benefits from the currently existing mechanisms, they are afraid of the consequences which could be caused by the collapse of the whole Union (or euro). However, identity defined in that way is not comprehensive. To become such, Union’s citizens should know not only what binds them, but also what makes them different from the others. The Union does not have adamant external enemies, its base on tolerance towards the otherness cannot define the explicit European model. It has problems with identity – both political and cultural, and the convincing solution still has not been found.

Crisis as a chance for the Union

When we take into consideration extreme opinions on the Union which are propagated in almost every country by the populist politicians, then we should not be astonished that almost no one cares to feel as an European. The united, federal Europe is still an invention of a narrow elite. The invention which cannot be realized without a real support of millions of people. It should be thought over how to win them now. Paradoxically, the crisis is probably the best moment to initiate real changes.

Translation: Anna Brzezińska (kamelia_88@wp.pl)

Unfortunately, there is a considerable risk that this change will remain – to the great extent – on paper only, since weak condition of Europe (an economic crisis, the increase of xenophobia and anti- immigrant feelings, a strong workers’ lobby) does not create favourable conditions for a necessary and robust receptiveness to the South. The awakening of the Arab world is of great significance not only for Europe, but also for Poland. Our strategic priority should be the creation of our own policy towards Muslim countries.

One bridge too far?

Jasmine revolution in Tunisia activated a process which brought to collapse the former policy of the European Union towards the South, based on the principle: “First of all: Stabilization”. European Union’s support for stabilization in the Arab world was loosely connected with fear of freedom, that is its possible democratization perceived – among others – as a potential threat. Free elections would lead to power the anti-western Islamists, considered as an almost uniform mass of radicals. However, the revolution in Tunisia revealed that the stabilization on the South is ostensible and – in the long run – impossible to retain. Moreover, its opposition to democratization is erroneous.  In reality the latter is an indispensable condition for stabilization. The most important lesson resulting from recent events is the collapse of the authoritarian modernization in the Arab world. Despite certain successes in the long run it is inefficient, because it does not solve the structural problems of the Arab countries. What is more, it can produce the opposite results. In fact, authoritarian regimes destroy the opposition that is  not ingrained in Islam, radicalize the Islamists and deepen the frustration of dissatisfied social masses. Unquestionably, the extension of the range of freedom will strengthen legitimization of power, create the safety valve for social discontent and soften radicals up by having them involved in the political process. However, it is worth remembering that the devil is in the detail. Europe’s fear of the appropriation of democracy by radical, totalitarian Islamists is not totally groundless. Therefore it is crucial for the success of democratization to create simultaneously favourable social, economic and political conditions, which means – simplifying – successful modernization. This programme, combining democratization and modernization, should take into consideration specificity of the Arab world and every Arab country. Without such a programme taking hold of any form of democracy in the Arab world will be extremely difficult. Obviously, the European Union is faced with one fundamental challenge of finding “a stick and a carrot”, which would stimulate reforms in the Arab countries. Definitely, so far the most effective tool of the EU was the accession process, which is out of the question in the case of southern neighbourhood. The most important manifestation of the change of attitude of the EU to the southern neighbour is the announcement of the European Commission “A new answer to the changing neighbourhood”, presented on the 25^th of May. This strategy assumes – to a considerable degree – transferring to the South the model of Eastern Partnership. The cornerstone of EU’s  policy toward the entire neighborhood should be the principle of political conditionality dependent on the scale of cooperation with neighbours and their reformative achievements (principle more for more). A clear emphasis has been placed on the need for supporting by EU the civil society and the freedom of media in the neighbouring countries. The committee has offered creation of the European Fund for Democracy and a support instrument for civil society – Civil Society Facility. The Union also announced a greater participation in resolving conflicts in the neighbourhood. As far as the economy is concerned, the commission proposed rewarding the top-reformers by bringing the rule of 3M into effect (more money, more market access, more mobility, that is more developmental aid, more access to the European market and more mobility – the liberalization of visa system). The new answer is certainly a clear step forward, however, it does not mean a radical redefinition of European approach to the Southern neighbourhood. For example, the increase in funding provided by the Commission is insufficient in comparison with the needs of the Southern countries. The Copernican turning point would be a suggestion to create in a long term the Mediterranean Economic Area, that is the equivalent of the European Economic Area (EEA) which encompasses the EU, Norway, Island and Lichtenstein. EEA is based on four freedoms of the EU: the movement of goods, people, services and capital. The three countries are part of the EU common market. They adopted a large part of the European legislation. Certainly, the membership in this type of commonwealth created for Mediterranean Sea would be an attractive carrot for the Southern countries and could – to a large extent – play a role similar to the perspective of  membership in the Central Europe, since Arab countries are not interested in accession. Unfortunately, even the realization of a much less ambitious plan of a “New Answer” hangs in the balance due to the lack of preparation of Europe for the challenges with which it has been faced. The economic crisis and simultaneously growing unemployment have strengthened the introvert character of Europe. Budget cuts seriously hinder the increase of the expenditure on developmental aid. A hysterical reaction on 25.000 of Tunisian immigrants, who arrived at the island Lampedusa, sharply demonstrates how strong are anti-immigrant feelings in the EU. Anti- immigrant and anti- Islamic parties win a record-breaking support (15-25 %) in certain countries. Right- wing politicians of the main party attempt at being “more papal than the Pope”, adopting the rhetoric of the radicals. In some countries (Holland, Denmark) rule of the past few years has belonged to the extreme right wing; what is more, they can be joined soon by other states. The economic crisis has very painfully hit Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, that is the countries, where for many years the agricultural lobby has been obstructing the opening of the market  for agricultural products from the South. Their readiness to change their stance on this issue is smaller than ever.

For our freedom and yours

Poland has an ambivalent attitude towards the Arab Springtime. On one hand, Poland – not unreasonably – is afraid of the fact that the problems of the southern countries will dominate (at the expense of important for us issues of the East) the policy of the EU. On the other hand, the necessity to combine democratization with modernity and seek sources of inspiration by Arab reformers create a great opportunity for Poland, which boasts about a successful recent political and economic transformation. Such a know- how do not involve Western Europe’s countries. An example of valuing our potential can be Barack Obama’s last visit to Poland, during which the U.S. president emphasized the need to share our experience with the Arab world. However, the crucial meaning for the success of Polish involvement on the South will have its scale, which will depend on realizing – in the country on the Vistula – how important is this region for polish national interests. After the jasmine revolution, Poland – in the name of supporting the policy of sharing our experience with Arab reformers – has stimulated itself in the southern neighbourhood on an unprecedented scale until now. We have focused above all on Tunisia, which has already been or will be visited by numerous polish delegations (a visit of a team NGO and MFA, Lech Wałęsa, Bogdan Borusewicz, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Radosław Sikorski). MFA in collaboration with NGO workers are concluding works on projects which are to be realized on the local level in Tunisia. It is worth remembering that minister Sikorski was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EU’s country who visited Benghazi. Poland was also a member of the contact group concerning Libya. Under an agreement with Qatar, the most important Arab television is going to shoot a documentary in Arabic and English about Polish transformation. Poland was the originator of creating by the EU the European Fund for Democracy. Warsaw can be particularly proud that the proposed reform of neighbourhood, especially the southern, presented by the Commission, treats as a model the Eastern Partnership, created by Poland and Sweden. Polish level of activity in the Arab world, however, requires from us to make an audit of strengths and weaknesses, and particularly answer to the fundamental question: what is the importance of the South for Poland? Are we there only altruistically, or do we have significant interests in this part of the world? Unquestionably, the East will always be more crucial for Poland than the South. Nevertheless, we must admit that the latter direction is underestimated in our country.

The South: Europe’s soft abdomen

Poland is a country which – if it wants to become one of the main European players – has to think in terms of the whole EU. And for the Union – whether we like it or not – the more important is the Mediterranean Area than the East. Firstly – because of the demographic and economic reasons. According to the UN the population of the Middle East, Northern Africa and Turkey has now 460 million, and in the year 2050 will reach 700 million. Around 2040 Egypt will have more inhabitants than Russia. According to Goldman Sachs and PricewaterhouseCoopers forecasts the average economic growth rate in Egypt in the years 2010- 2050 will gain more than 7%, whereas in Russia and Ukraine – 3-4%. Around 2050 a purchasing power of Turkey will probably be slightly smaller than the Russian or German.

Secondly – because of the political reasons. In order to gain the position of a global player Europe has to stabilize its neighbourhood, but the South is much more problematic than the East. For Poland, which focuses on European defence politics and energy security, the countries of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) are of enormous importance. Europe thinks of using on a great scale the solar energy form the Northern Africa. Poland wants to reduce its dependency on the Russian gas, and the alternative can be gas from the Middle East. The processes in the EU also cannot be ignored – in the immediate decades Germany – orientated towards Russia – will probably lose its position of the most populous country of the EU. There will be also a reduction in the number of inhabitants of the new union’s countries, that is the countries most interested in the eastern neighbourhood. However, in the countries particularly Islam- oriented – France, Spain, Great Britain – there will take place an increase in the number of the Muslim inhabitants. In several decades they will constitute 20% of France’s dwellers. These processes concern also Poland – it is said that by 2050 our population will have shrunk by 6 million. The society will become much more older, there will be lack of manpower. Even a very good family-oriented, economic and social policy will not solve the problems caused by these factors. We will have to count on immigrants. Nowadays we consider Ukraine and Belarus as our traditional base of migration, but the demographic forecasts of these countries are worse than ours. We have to be prepared for a situation in which – whether we like it or not – a significant part of the new Polish citizens might be Muslims. A problem of the South is not restricted to the Mediterranean Area. Europe has to look at it in the context of relations with the Islamic world, especially with the Great Middle East, stretching away from Spain, to China and India. Also on the East there will be more and more of South in the future, that is on the Crimea, in Georgia, Russia and Central Asia. Even nowadays near 15% of the Russian citizens are Muslims, and in few decades they will constitute 30% of the society. The largest increase will occur in the Northern Caucasus, which is Russia’s Achilles’ heel. Demographically and economically dynamic Turkey has even currently a significant influence on a post- Soviet area. It will become much more stronger in the future, while Russia will be growing weaker. Another “emerging” Muslim regional superpower operating in the post- soviet area  can be Iran, especially if there takes place a liberalization of its political system. Its huge gas reserves can become – form the perspective of Poland – a basic alternative for the Russian gas.

Strengths and weaknesses of Poland

Poland does not have a colonial luggage and a tradition of a long-term confrontation with Muslims. What is more, in the recent years, due to our minimal presence in the region, we have not compromised ourselves with cordial relations with the local dictators. Poland bordered with the Ottoman Empire for four centuries. However, only for a quarter of century (with intermittent) fought battles with the country, which were much less bloody than other conflicts of the time. France likes to highlight that it was the first country that have signed in 1535 an unprecedented treaty of friendship with Ottomans, but, in reality, Poland did it two years earlier. The connections with Islam were clearly visible especially in Sarmatism[1] –  an original and exceptional current in Polish culture. Poland has a unique in Europe tradition of an unbroken coexistence with a Muslim minority (Tatar community that has been living in Poland for centuries). Spain invokes Al-Andalus, the heritage of Muslim government from the years 711- 1492. It had been drowned in a sea of blood by extremely catholic Spanish kings, but even though Spain still reckons that nowadays the Muslims can play a role of an important Turkey’s  partner as a part of Alliance of Civilization – a forum of dialogue created by the UN. Should not this position be occupied by Poland? The Poles have also played a significant role in the modernization of Turkish people (Tatars, Turks, Azeris) in the 19^th and in the beginning of the 20^th centuries, frequently after converting to Islam. Another strong point of Poland is – paradoxically – the heritage of communism. With all the major cultural differences there can be found important similarities of historical experiences between Poland and numerous Muslim countries, governed by Soviet or pro-communist regimes (authoritarianism, role of the army, control over the economy). Particularly important Poland’s contribution to the democratization of the Muslim world could be the ideas of violence rejections by the democratic opposition and the conception of the round table, which means the evolutionary transformation based on a dialogue and inclusion of former enemies in the political life. The essential meaning of “Solidarity” in the Polish revolution is also our asset – e.g. in Tunisia trade unions have played an important role in toppling Ben Aliego’s regime. Our experiences concerning creation of the free media and non- governmental organizations in the beginning of the 90s can be inspiring for the Arabs. Many Muslim countries need not only democracy, but also radical economic reforms. Arab leaders should study the birth of capitalism in the era of Balcerowicz, who used the experiences of others, theoretically exotic countries (Chile). The experience of the Polish NGO workers can be also useful in supporting transformation in the post-soviet countries. Last but not least, the role of the Catholic Church during Polish transformation can also be an interesting subject for Muslim societies, which has to define place of the religion in the new political order. Polish Church, strongly present in the Mediterranean region and associated with John Paul II, who was wellliked by the Muslims mostly for the idea of similarities of Abraham’s religion, is unquestionably an interesting partner for dialogue for the moderate Muslims. This dialogue would also be favoured by  greater – in comparison with the Western Europe – conservatism and religiousness of the Polish society, which makes Poles more tolerant towards the presence of religious symbols in the public space (e.g. wearing shawls by female students) than the Frenchmen. Apart from that, Poles are more similar to the Muslims than to Swedes as far as the issues connected with philosophy of life are concerned (homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia). A significant issue for the modernization and democratization of Arab countries will be the shape of relation Turkey- the EU and the internal situation of the first one. Nowadays Turkey is very popular in the Arab world and considered a source of inspiration as a moderately successful Islam, democracy (although with defects) and free market marriage. In this situation a very good Polish- Turkish relations, which have recently undergone intensification, can be regarded as another Polish asset.

In the Islamic world today, we are represented almost only by the soldiers and tourists. We often travel to Egypt, Tunisia. Almost all of our military missions after the 1989 have landed in the countries inhabited by the Muslims. But even the educated Pole knows about Islam less than a Westerner. Our prejudices towards Muslims, especially the Arabs, are larger than in certain western countries. The quality of Arabic or Turkish studies in Poland also leaves a lot to be desired. Our economic relations with Islamic world are weak, while with the countries of the Southern neighbourhood – minimal. Our political activity in the Mediterranean region has been – until recently – limited.  If Poland wants to come into being in the South, it has to discern the weaknesses of its involvement on the East (a small developmental aid, an insufficient number of scholarships, limited Polish investments and trade). Our greatest weakness is a discord between our modernization and democratic rhetoric and practical activities. Polish developmental aid is solely 0,08 % of our GDP. In the years 2007-2009 its main recipient was China, which received more money than the countries of Partnership taken together. A Polish developmental aid is almost four times smaller than of a slightly richer Portugal. The participation of foreign students in the academic community is minimal in Poland, it is the lowest in the whole Union.  In Poland studies only 300 students from the Middle East – which is 25 times less than in Ukraine. Poland’s problem is balancing its attitude towards Israel. We will be always connected by a unique ties of a common history and  democracy. However, a true friendship should not be based exclusively on an uncritical affirmation. It is difficult not to recognize as such the February visit of Polish government in Israel, during which we have defined ourselves as a philosemitic country. We did not have any reservations about strongly right- wing Israeli rule towards Palestine. After all, Hilary Clinton has recently acknowledged it as a threat for Israel’s future and the stabilization of the region.

Certainly, Poland will not substitute France as a main EU’s  player in the Northern Africa. However, we can find our niche making use of our strengths and overcoming the weaknesses. No one can be a champion in every field, especially with an average potential. That is why Polish resignation form involvement in the whole Arab world is a correct self- restriction. However, focusing solely on Tunisia would be an unnecessary lmitation, interpreted as a seasonal interest in the region. An optimal solution for Poland seems to be gaining in the Union the status of a “post- soviet expert on Islam, Turkey and Iran”, and focusing on one Arab region (Maghreb). Nonetheless, a realization of such ambitions demands improving the whole Polish foreign policy, significant increase in development assistance, educational and economic relations with the Muslim world. Otherwise our involvement will be superficial and not treated seriously by the Muslims.

* Fragments of this article had been recently published in the text “An Eagle and the Crescent”, which appeared in “Gazeta Wyborcza” in the beginning of May of this year.

[1] The culture of Polish nobility in the 17th and 18th centuries (przyp.tłum.)

Translation: Anna Brzezińska  kamelia_88@wp.pl

]]> http://liberteworld.com/2011/09/08/the-arab-springtime-of-nations-challenge-for-the-eu-and-poland/feed/ 0 http://liberteworld.com/2011/09/08/about-equality/ http://liberteworld.com/2011/09/08/about-equality/#comments Thu, 08 Sep 2011 21:22:52 +0000 Wojciech Sadurski http://liberteworld.com/?p=805 If it is possible, by means of social redistribution of resources (the use of e.g. tax measures or social welfare), to minimize the negative impact on our lives by certain factors that are beyond our control, such a strategy realizes the liberal ideal of freedom. It provides deep justification for this ideal of freedom.

Liberalism – as I understand and accept it – is a deeply egalitarian philosophy, though equality is not its fundamental nor intrinsic feature.

The previous sentence sounds terrible – equivocal and wavering, by means of typical “on the one hand – on the other hand”. In this article, I will attempt to convince the Reader that it is not true and – at least as I intent, not absurdly – this sentence is precise, internally coherent and valid.

I understand the notion of “the fundamental value” strictly and literally: as a value-fundament, which is a basis for a certain philosophy or world view. It is a value that begins our reasoning, serves as an argument when we encounter dilemmas or conflicts of ideas that cannot be solved otherwise, or when each solution seems equally wrong or (less often) equally good. Freedom – as Ronald Dworkin wrote in the title of his book – is such a value in liberalism. It is freedom that is the starting point and serves us to solve moral dilemmas and controversies (“us” – means liberals).

Equality is not an intrinsic value, too. I understand an intrinsic (or, to use another notion, “inherent”) value as an ideal that is valuable itself. Unfortunately, it is an “idem per idem” explanation, but I hope the Reader can guess what I mean by that: an ideal that does not have to be linked to other ideals to gain moral value. In other words, an intrinsic value is not of instrumental character, thus it is valid even if it does not fulfil any other ideals. To accept the fact that equality is not and cannot be an intrinsic value in this sense, it is enough to carry out the following test: equality in poverty must be better than inequality in wealth for somebody who considers equality an intrinsic value. Or, to put it schematically: situation (I), where persons A and B have 2 units of certain goods each, that is distributable (e.g. material wealth, access to culture, education, etc.) is better than a situation (II), where A has 3 and B – 4 units. The opinion that situation (I) may be perceived as morally better than situation (II) is in my opinion absurd. Therefore, I consider absurd the belief that equality may be an intrinsic value.

That is enough for the negative disquisition: equality is not (at least for me) a fundamental nor an intrinsic value. Is it, however, invisible for a liberal? Right the opposite: equality (in its strong, or even quite radical version, though I will try to articulate the nature of this “radicalism” below) is the inevitable implication of liberal freedom when perceived correctly – an ideal that has both fundamental and intrinsic character for liberals.

I do not intent – to calm the Reader that may be worried at this point – to introduce a relation between freedom and equality by the use of a semantic or definitional trick that would expand the notion of freedom in a way that it includes also equality. “Equal freedom for everyone” – it sounds very nice, but – firstly, it does not remove possible conflicts between the two nouns in this ideal; secondly – it restricts the use of equality solely to “distributing freedom”. Equality, however, as I understand it (and as it is worth reflection and defense), must also refer – maybe above all – to material resources. “Currency” of equality is not just e.g. freedom to express ideas but, first of all – certain scope of material goods that allow us to lead a worthy, interesting and fulfilled life in a society and provide access to such goods as educations, culture, professional life or power.

We must think about connections between freedom and equality more seriously. However – relying on the statement that freedom is a fundamental and intrinsic ideal for liberals – we need to start with a reflection about freedom. Readers of “Liberté!”encountered my reflections “About freedom” in one of the previous issues of the magazine (no V, pp. 50-55). Therefore, I will only say briefly that I understand freedom in the traditional liberal way, as negative freedom that implies no external duress. I understand duress as a situation that results from other people’s intentions (or a situation that, at least, can be modified by others), when I am confronted with options that are all unfavourable for me (worse than before duress) and I have to choose the least bad option, which is more favourable for other people. This is the negative understanding of freedom, inspired by Friedrich Hayek (on the first pages of “Constitution of freedom”). He is convincing for me in this matter, though his understanding of duress that is limited to actions of specific individuals is too narrow for me.

Equality understood in this way, i.e. as a lack of external duress (or, in a more realistic and modest way, limitation of external duress to minimum), is both a fundamental and intrinsic ideal for a liberal. However, it does not mean that we cannot ask about a more profound ideal, a vision of humanity or a model of life that would be essential for such an ideal? What does “no external duress” involve that we can treat this state as desired and attractive? What vision of humanity – happiness or fulfillment – does such an idea support? It is not a non-controversial, obvious ideal shared by everyone. Right the opposite – it may not suit many people (especially some conservatives, traditionalists and supporters of authoritarianism). Hence, we, liberals, carry the duty to justify and defend it. We can deduce its legitimacy from objections formulated against it by conservative critics who affirm ideals of human life that are different from life in such freedom.

It seems that the most efficient (and possibly the only) defense may refer to the ideal of a person who is (I apologize for solemnity of this statement) the architect of one’s own fate. It is a person who is not subject to other people’s will and impersonal fate, but forms their life according to one’s beliefs and preferences. It is concordant with the Kantian ideal of autonomy – a state where we are not just a tool used to accomplish other people’s plans, but we form our life according to our own plan and conception of good. Or – if someone is searching for other philosophical provenances of such an ideal – concordant with Millian individualism: affirmation of a human as independent of tyrannical superstitions, tradition or the opinion of majority. Or – if someone prefers convincing moral intuitions that origin from folk wisdom rather than respected philosophers of the past – concordant with the ideal of a person who reaps what they have sown.

If it is so, we need to make our lives completely independent of the factors we do not influence and which may negatively influence our self-fulfilment. It does not mean that the ideal of freedom should eliminate e.g. the law of gravity or getting older – certain things are “natural” in the sense that they are part of human condition and we cannot influence them. Hence, the only reasonable approach is to humbly accept them and adapt to them. Defining what is natural in this sense is in fact historically changeable and socially determined. If we can minimize the negative influence of some factors, which are beyond our control, on our lives, as a result of social redistribution of resources, such a strategy realizes the liberal ideal of freedom. In any case, it is an answer to the deep justification of that ideal of freedom.

This strategy must lead to more equality than the one we can see in the existing societies – in this sense, it is quite radical egalitarianism (if the degree of changes that are necessary to reconcile reality with the ideal is the measure of “radicalism”). This egalitarianism requires reducing inequalities – namely those resulting from factors over which we do not have control and which place us in an underprivileged position. It is thus an ideal of equality that reflects the influence of conscious decisions, preferences, choices and efforts and not objective factors in the achievements of people. It is an ideal of freedom that requires neutralization of the influence of “accidental” factors on inequalities. I understand “accidental factors” as factors that are independent of a person and thus are out of their control.

Is this really egalitarianism? In the principal sense – no: this ideal does not require equality as such, but it requires the real inequalities to reflect only our decisions, plans, preferences and efforts which may be in fact very unequal. In the empirical sense – yes, because a society which would fit such an ideal would be much more egalitarian that any known real societies.  These tolerate and cement many inequalities shaped by factors that are completely independent of us: birthplace, wealth of our parents or their ingenuity, sex or skin colour, etc.

But what can we do with such “accidental factors” like innate intelligence, strength or beauty – these factors are in a sense “beyond our control” (regardless of my efforts I will never be a good fiddler or sculptor), but certainly influence our choices? There is probably no reason for them to be beyond the interest of liberal ideal of equality. Of course, the point is not  the redistribution of these qualities (it would be impossible, undesirable and unjust), but only minimizing the influence of inequalities connected with them on our lives. Certain benefits that come from them cannot and should not be eliminated. What we can do – via social redistribution e.g. of taxes – is to organize the social distribution of benefits in such a way that will prevent the underprivileged from being affected by excessively negative results of these so to speak “natural” shortages. This is how I understand the basic idea of the liberal theory of justice by John Rawls; inequalities in distribution should be justified for the benefit of the underprivileged. Social instruments of justice should neutralize what can be named as “natural” injustice. Nature, as rightly argued Rawls, is neighter just nor unjust; it is social consequences which derive from natural differences that are evaluated in terms of justice.

A while ago, the ideal has been presented as controversial, but at the same time very simple: it is the ideal of eliminating chance in social distribution. I dedicated a major part of my recent book “Equality and Legitimacy” (Oxford University Press 2008) to develop and defend this concept of equality – and I am not even able to  summarize it here. Instead, I will recall two most obvious charges that can be formulated against it.

The first charge is that this ideal is too harsh and too “little forgetting” since it obliges us to sustain inequalities. Although they result from conscious decisions, we should neutralize them by forgetting mistakes or excessively risky decisions. The Polish Prime Minister said: “They should have secured themselves” about helpless victims of the flood. This sentence was shocking, though significant. From the point of view of “luck egalitarianism” he was absolutely right, also in the moral sense. The same refers to every risky gambler or – any person who takes bad decisions in their lives. To answer this charge, I will say: in fact, although risk is part of our lives, in certain situations we are ready to paternally equalize the outcome of other people’s wrong decisions. This is at variance with the ideal of liberal equality, but this ideal should be moderated by the ideals of forgiveness, mercy, charity and empathy. Facing such values, we encounter limits of liberal equality and freedom, though we are ready to accept some dose of paternalism.

The dilemma is certainly broader and indicates at the fundamental problem in applying the ideal of equality. In order to put this ideal into practice, we must separate the “accidental” factors ( in the sense that people subject to them do not have control over them) from the factors we can control – factors we can shape by our own will and for which we are so to say responsible. Is it possible to make such a distinction? Yes, I think – though we could argue which specific factors should be classified to one or another category, as well as stages in-between. However, if we negated the categories of facts and factors that are actually controlled by our will, we would negate the aesthetic sensibility of numerous social practices – as the institution of punishing for crimes according to the committed offence.

The ideal of freedom, which lies in eliminating inequalities that result from “accidental factors”, is at the same time radical and very simple – a rare combination in moral reflections. It is radical, because its application, as I have mentioned before, would lead to a society basically different from the one we can see around us. It is also extremely simple, as it comes from one of the most elementary moral intuitions: human fate should be shaped by people themselves. It supports the liberal principle of freedom as the elimination of external duress. If we apply it also to the principles of material distribution, we will obtain the picture of equality. As I have indicated in the first sentence of this text – equality is neither a fundamental nor intrinsic value, but it gives liberalism much more egalitarian character than it is usually seen in discussions, where the ideal of freedom opposes the ideal of equality in liberalism in a superficial way. It does not limit the liberal ideal of equality to the purely formal equality to the law or equal rights, which is understood clearly meritocratically. Such perception disregards the way our chances to achieve qualifications are determined. These qualifications figure as an operand in the ideal of equal rights.

Translation: Marek Pinta (marek.plinta@gmail.com)